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Psychological reactance occurs in response to threats posed to perceived behavioral
freedoms. Research has shown that people can also experience vicarious reactance.
They feel restricted in their own freedom even though they are not personally involved in
the restriction but only witness the situation. The phenomenon of vicarious reactance is
especially interesting when considered in a cross-cultural context because the cultural
specific self-construal plays a crucial role in understanding people’s response to self-
and vicariously experienced restrictions. Previous studies and our pilot study (N = 197)
could show that people with a collectivistic cultural background show higher vicarious
reactance compared to people with an individualistic cultural background. But does it
matter whether people experience the vicarious restriction for an in-group or an out-
group member? Differentiating vicarious-in-group and vicarious-out-group restrictions,
Study 1 (N = 159) suggests that people with a more interdependent self-construal
show stronger vicarious reactance only with regard to in-group restrictions but not
with regard to out-group restrictions. In contrast, participants with a more independent
self-construal experience stronger reactance when being self-restricted compared to
vicariously-restricted. Study 2 (N = 180) replicates this pattern conceptually with regard
to individualistic and collectivistic cultural background groups. Additionally, participants’
behavioral intentions show the same pattern of results. Moreover a mediation analysis
demonstrates that cultural differences in behavioral intentions could be explained through
people’s self-construal differences. Thus, the present studies provide new insights and
show consistent evidence for vicarious reactance depending on participants’ culturally
determined self-construal.
Keywords: (vicarious) reactance, restrictions, self-construal, culture
Introduction and Theory
“Untold are the hardships of man. Yet nothing worse may befall him but the loss of freedom.”
Ho Chi Minh
Freedom is one of ourmost important values, even on a daily basis.Wewant to be free in thought and
behavior, and we wish to be without restrictions. Are these thoughts about freedom universal across
cultures or are there cultural differences? In order to answer this question, it seems reasonable to
consider previously established research on culture dependent patterns of thinking and perception,
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e.g., different cognitive styles (Markus and Kitayama, 1991;
Nisbett et al., 2001; Varnum et al., 2008, 2010). Thus, studies have
shown, for example that Croatians and East Asians think in amore
holistic fashion than U.S. Americans and other Westerners. This
means that their cognition among other things is characterized
by thematic and family-resemblance-based categorization of
objects (Nisbett et al., 2001; Varnum et al., 2008). The origin of
these cultural differences is traceable to marked differences in
interpersonal social orientation. Following Varnum et al. (2010),
people differ with regard to possessing amore independent versus
interdependent social orientation. Interdependently-orientated
people primarily define their self-construal in relation to others:
they strive to be part of a group, seek group harmony, and
consequently seem to feel free in belonging to a group and
following group beliefs. The interdependent view is dominant
in people from collectivistic cultures, such as those from Asia
and Africa (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Savani et al., 2008). By
contrast, independently-orientated people are characterized by
individuality and independence from others. The independent
view is most clearly exemplified in individualistic cultures,
such as in North America, as well as in many Western
European cultures. Statements such as “being free from others”
are typical for individualistic cultures (Markus and Kitayama,
1991; Triandis, 1995). As cultures differ with regard to their
perception of freedom, they might also differ with regard to
their thinking and behaving when this freedom is threatened.
Indeed, previous research in the context of reactance theory
(Brehm, 1966) has shown that it is important for people from an
individualistic cultural background (e.g., European Americans)
not to be restricted in their personal freedom (e.g., regarding
their personal wishes), whereas for people with a collectivistic
cultural background (e.g., Asian Americans), it is more important
that their group’s freedom is not restricted (Jonas et al., 2009).
Moreover, research not only reveals that there are cultural
differences with regard to the experience of reactance, but also
that people from a collectivistic cultural background (i.e., Eastern
Europeans) show more “vicarious reactance,” i.e., they react
more strongly when observing the restriction of another person
(Sittenthaler and Jonas, 2012).
In the current paper, the main focus was to investigate the
specific role of self-construal and culture when witnessing the
restrictions to freedom of another person who belongs to one’s in-
group versus to an out-group. What is happening in people with
an independent vs. interdependent self-construal, when observing
the restriction of another person’s freedom and does it make a
difference whether this person is an in-group versus an out-group
member? Do people with a more interdependent self-construal
experience more vicarious reactance for in-group vs. out-group
members than peoplewith amore independent self-construal?We
expect to find considerable cultural differences due to differences
in peoples’ self-construal.
Freedom and (Vicarious) Reactance Theory
Reactance theory emphasizes the importance of “specific”
individual freedoms and defines conditions under which people
react against threats to these freedoms. Reactance is defined as
a motivational state with the goal to reestablish the threatened
freedom. As reactance is a motivational state it is more than just
an emotion such as the feeling of frustration. As a motivational
process it should energize and direct behavior toward a positive
stimuli or away from a negative stimuli (Roseman, 2009).
Nevertheless, reactance may also have applications in explaining
concepts such as frustration, social power, and compliance
(Brehm, 1966; Donnell et al., 2001). In order to get rid of the
unfavorable motivational state of reactance, people can strive to
reestablish the threatened freedom directly, e.g., by continuing
a behavior, that has been prohibited, or indirectly, e.g., by
boycotting another request by the authority that has eliminated
one’s autonomy of freedom (Brehm, 1966, 1972; Worchel and
Brehm, 1971; Wicklund, 1974; Brehm and Brehm, 1981). A
direct method of reestablishing one’s freedom is to engage in the
proscribed behavior. For instance, interest in viewing violence
in television is increased by reading labels that warn of violent
content (Bushman and Stack, 1996), and choice of unhealthy
food products like sweet granola bars is increased after reading
recommendations for healthier alternative brands (Fitzsimons
and Lehmann, 2004). Reactance can also be aroused by product
unavailability which motivates people to get the unavailable
product (Clee and Wicklund, 1980). Similarly, social influence
attempts can backfire (i.e., boomerang effect), in that pressure
toward the requested change may induce the person to move in
the direction opposite from the influence effort (e.g., Silvia, 2005,
2006).
Beside the broad reactance research, Miron and Brehm (2006)
first raised the question of whether reactance could also be
experienced on behalf of another person whose freedom of choice
is threatened but they did not provide empirical evidence for
their idea of “empathic reactance.” However, research concerning
different emotions suggests that people can experience vicarious
emotions, such as empathic distress or vicarious sympathy
(Batson et al., 1987; Ortony et al., 1988; Eisenberg et al., 1991;
Scherer, 1998). Furthermore, people can feel vicariously ashamed,
guilty or retributive when observing another’s wrongdoing or
aggressive behavior in a specific situation (Lickel et al., 2005,
2006). However, related to vicarious “reactant feelings,” Worchel
et al. (1974) and Andreoli et al. (1974) described a similar kind
of experiencing reactance on behalf of another person in the
sense of a perspective-taking point of view. They tried to find
out how the observing person thinks about the feelings of the
restricted person—however, they did not investigate whether
the observer’s own feelings change observing the restriction of
another person. Research from our lab (Sittenthaler et al., 2015,
in preparation) has shown that people can indeed experience
vicarious reactance, when perceiving someone else’s freedom as
threatened. However, different processes seem to be activated
during self-experienced vs. vicariously experienced reactance.
When we experience reactance ourselves, physiological reactions
as measured by pulse rate have been found to be stronger for
self-experienced as compared to vicarious reactance. In contrast,
vicarious reactance is affected by “cognitive load” tasks (e.g.,
remembering seven digits), suggesting that cognitive processes
are important whereas emotional arousal plays less of a role
compared to self-experienced reactance, which is primarily
affected by “emotional feelings-inducing” tasks (e.g., thinking of
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a great summer day). Taking together this body of research we
suggest a combined dual-process and intertwined-process model
explaining the emotional and cognitive processes of self- and
vicarious-reactance (Sittenthaler et al., 2015, in preparation).
Vicarious Reactance and the Role of Culture
“Vicarious reactance” seems to be an especially interesting
topic to be examined in a cultural context. A cross-cultural
look might help to better understand the phenomenon of
vicarious reactance in finding differences concerning vicarious
reactance values depending on different cultural background
groups. Although reactance is typically considered to be pan-
cultural, there seem to be systematic variations based on the
cultural background. In a series of studies, Jonas et al. (2009)
could show that there are differences in the self-experience of
reactance between persons with Eastern versus Western cultural
backgrounds. They found that although collectivists reacted to
a threat addressing their individual freedom (e.g., a personal
good) with less reactance (compared to individualists), they
showed strong reactance when the threat addressed a collective
freedom (e.g., a common good). Furthermore previous research
revealed that people with a collectivistic cultural background
experienced more vicarious reactance compared to people with
an individualistic cultural background. Steindl and Jonas (2012)
and Sittenthaler and Jonas (2012) performed studies on vicarious
reactance among collectivists from the Philippines and other
Eastern European countries (e.g., the Czech Republic, Romania,
Russia) and found that the cultural backgroundplays an important
role in understanding different reactance effects. To replicate
those interesting findings we conducted a pilot study using a
different cultural subgroup.
Pilot Study
We recruited Arabic immigrants living in Austria as participants
for our study. Former research in individualistic countries showed
that Muslim participants immigrated in individualistic countries
such as the United States (Barry et al., 2000) or France (Croucher
et al., 2008) indeed have a more interdependent self-construal.
In a similar way, Barry (2005) found that Arabic immigrants
(approximately 84%, described themselves as Muslim) were more
likely to have an interdependent than an independent self-
construal. Muslims emphasize the primary role of family in
their life, relationships as well as stress-connectedness and social
context. Thus they belong to the group of collectivists (Jameela,
1967; Hasan, 2001). On the other hand, people from Germany
and Austria have a similar high I-C Index ( = individualism-
collectivism Index) compared to the United States where higher
numbers indicate more individualism (Hofstede, 1997; Suh
et al., 1998; Schimmack et al., 2002). Thus German and
Austrian people could be assigned to the group of individualists.
Measuring the self-construal (Triandis and Gelfand, 1998) in our
study we could confirm those findings, our Arabic participants
(M =  1.16, SD = 0.65) were more collectivistic compared to
German and Austrian participants (M =  0.44, SD = 0.68),
t(195) =  7.35, p < 0.001. A negative value indicated relatively
more interdependent self-construal and a positive value indicated
relatively more independent self-construal. For that reason,
we expected that participants with a collectivistic cultural
background would experience more vicarious reactance than
participants with an individualistic cultural background. We
also assumed that participants with an individualistic cultural
background would show more reactance being self-restricted
than being vicariously-restricted. The pilot study consisted of
a 3 (restriction: self vs. vicarious vs. control condition)  2
(cultural background: collectivistic vs. individualistic) factorial
between subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to
the three experimental restriction conditions. Participants were
197 students and employees living in Salzburg, Austria. 123
participants had an individualistic cultural background [30 male
and 92 female, 1 missing value, mean age 25.17 years (SD= 7.78)]
and 74 participants had a collectivistic cultural background [15
male and 59 female, mean age 26.12 years (SD= 8.47)].We used a
scenario, manipulating reactance. In the self-restricted condition,
participants were asked to imagine that they were searching a
new job in a famous company and the personnel manager of
the company was not willing to invite them to a job interview
for no apparent reason. In the vicariously-restricted condition,
the volunteers were asked to think of a friend experiencing the
same situation. In the control condition, the students were asked
to imagine that s/he would get the job without experiencing any
restrictions. After participants had read the scenario, we assessed
participants’ feeling of reactance (“experience of reactance”:
a = 0.93, 6 items, e.g., “To what extent do you perceive the
reaction of the personnel manager as a restriction of freedom?”
and “How much pressure do you feel as a result of his reaction?”;
see Jonas et al., 2009, as well as “behavioral intentions”: a = 0.84,
7 items, e.g., “How strong is your wish to complain about the
personnel manager?” and “Would you like to fight against the
personnelmanagers behavior?”). Answers were given on a 5-point
Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much)1.
We ran a 3 (restriction: self vs. vicarious vs. control
condition)  2 (cultural background: collectivistic vs.
individualistic) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the
experience of reactance measure and found the predicted
cultural background  restriction interaction, F(2, 191) = 3.11,
p= 0.047,!2p= 0.03.
2 The follow-up simple effects analyses within
1For explorative analyses we measured the subscales “Victim Sensitivity” and
“Observer Sensitivity” from the “Justice Sensitivity Inventory” by Schmitt
et al. (2005) in all studies. Furthermore we controlled for negative affect using
the negative PANAS Scale by Watson et al. (1988). In our pilot study and
Study 1 we tried to figure out the identity of our participants using adapted
Venn-diagrams by Schubert and Otten (2002). In Study 2 we used items from
the Generalized self-efficacy scale by Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) and
outrage measurement by Batson et al. (2007). In our pilot study we utilized
The Therapeutic Reactance Scale by Dowd et al. (1991) as well as an adapted
version of the Religion Scale by Zwingmann et al. (1994).
2Furthermore, we found a significant main-effect of the restriction
manipulation, F(2, 191) = 235.88, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.71, indicating that
participants in the self-restricted (M = 4.32, SD = 0.63) and the vicariously-
restricted conditions (M = 4.29, SD = 0.82) showed higher experience
of reactance scores than participants in the control condition (M = 1.54,
SD = 0.86). Subsequent post hoc analysis showed significant differences
between both the self-restricted and the vicariously-restricted condition
compared to the control condition, ps < 0.001. In addition, there was
no significant difference between the self-restricted and the vicariously-
restricted condition, p = 0.938. A second main-effect was found for the
cultural background, F(1, 191) = 6.24, p < 0.013, !2p = 0.03, indicating that
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TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations for experience of reactance.
“Individualistic cultural “Collectivistic cultural
background” a, b background” a, b
M SD M SD
Self-restricted condition 4.31 (n = 43) 0.67 4.32 (n = 25) 0.56
condition
Vicariously- 4.01 (n = 40) 0.90 4.65 (n = 32) 0.55
restricted condition
Control 1.48 (n = 40) 0.79 1.68 (n = 17) 1.02
condition
a Individualistic cultural background= Austrian/German participants; Collectivistic cultural
background = Arabic participants. bJudgments were made on a 5-point scale with high
values indicating high experience of reactance.
the vicariously-restricted condition supported our hypothesis,
that participants with a collectivistic cultural background
experienced more vicarious reactance compared to participants
with an individualistic cultural background, F(1, 191) = 12.83,
p < 0.001, !2p = 0.06. With regard to the self-restricted, F(1,
191) < 1, p = 0.974, !2p = 0.01, and the control condition F(1,
191) < 1, p = 0.355, !2p < 0.01, the experience of reactance did
not depend on culture. Participants with a collectivistic cultural
background, participants being self-restricted experienced
about the same level of reactance compared to participants in
the vicariously-restricted condition, p = 0.105. Participants in
the self-restricted and in the vicariously-restricted condition
displayed higher reactance values compared to participants in the
control condition, ps< 0.001. Participants with an individualistic
cultural background tended to show more reactance in the self-
restricted condition compared to participants in the vicariously-
restricted condition, p = 0.065. Participants in the self-restricted
and in the vicariously-restricted condition displayed higher
reactance compared with participants in the control condition,
ps< 0.01.Means and standard deviations are displayed inTable 1.
Following these results, we could replicate our previous
findings showing that people with a collectivistic cultural
background showed more vicarious reactance than people with
an individualistic cultural background (Sittenthaler and Jonas,
2012). The increased experience of vicarious reactance can now
be generalized to diverse collectivistic countries such as the
Philippines, Czech Republic, Russia, Romania as well as Arabic
countries compared to Germany and Austria. It seems that
vicarious reactance is important for people with a collectivistic
cultural background because they define their identity mainly via
the relatedness with other people or groups of persons. For that
reason, they try to maintain the well-being of the group (e.g.,
Hannover and Kühnen, 2002). Because other people from their
group form a part of their self-construal (Markus and Kitayama,
1991) people with a collectivistic cultural background should
be more sensitive to vicarious restrictions compared to people
participants with a collectivistic cultural background (M = 3.85, SD = 1.38)
showed higher experience of reactance scores compared to participants with
an individualistic cultural background (M = 3.29, SD = 1.49). A second
ANOVA concerning behavioral intentions did not provide a significant
restriction cultural background interaction effect, F(2, 191)< 1, p= 0.647,
!2p = 0.01.
with an individualistic cultural background. However, can we
really explain these cultural differences with regard to vicarious
reactance with differences in people’s self-construal?
Self-construal Differences
Restrictions of freedom threaten the self-construal of a person
as they imply that the person may not be a self- but an other-
directed being. By showing reactance, people demonstrate that
they do indeed have freedom and thus increase the value of their
threatened self by wanting to restore their freedom (Brehm, 1966;
Brehm andBrehm, 1981). Former research as described abovewas
able to show crucial cultural differences in what people consider
to be important for their subjective feeling of freedom (Jonas et al.,
2009).
Cross-cultural studies, however, show that there are important
differences in the self-construal of members of collectivistic
and individualistic cultural groups (Singelis, 1994; Hong and
Chiu, 2001; Kanagawa et al., 2001; Wang, 2001; Kolstad and
Horpestad, 2009). These studies show that the proportion of
these aspects in the self-construal of a person stands in relation
with the more geographical-societal dimension of individualism
and collectivism that was first employed by Hofstede (1980).
The cultural self-construal distinguishes between independent
and interdependent aspects in the human self. People with
a collectivistic cultural background tend to have a more
interdependent self-construal focus compared to people with
an individualistic cultural background. Interdependence and
independence are variables that tend to explain differences at
an individual level, related to self-perception (e.g., Markus and
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1996; Triandis and Gelfand, 1998).
More precisely, as stated by Cross et al. (2011), Individualism-
Collectivism is a dimension used to describe cultures, whereas the
independent-interdependent self-construal describes individuals.
Most cultures seem to present a combination of individualism
and collectivism qualities andmost people hold both independent
and interdependent self-construal in different combination and
of different content and quality (Holland et al., 2004). The
cultural context typically promotes the development of one or
the other self-construal more strongly. Thus, more independent
self-construals are dominant in Western cultures (e.g., North
American, Western European), whereas more interdependent
self-construals are dominant in Eastern and Southern cultures
(e.g., Asia, Latin America). People with a more independent self-
construal focus on personal attributes (e.g., personal desires),
which are independent of others. Their self-construal therefore
emphasizes the importance of having the freedom to make
one’s own choices and expressing one’s own desires and
preferences. Individualism emphasizes individual uniqueness,
personal autonomy, and independence. Traditionally, persons
with a more interdependent self-construal define their identity
mainly in the relatedness with other people or groups of people.
For that reason, they also highly value relationships with others,
as well as the harmony, interdependent cohesion, and well-being
of the group (e.g., Hannover and Kühnen, 2002). Americans,
for example, endorse the belief related to individual autonomy,
whereas Asians endorse the belief related to collective autonomy
(Menon et al., 1999). People with a more interdependent
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self-construal have a stronger focus on other people. The
relationship between the self and other people is assumed to be
much closer. Siblings, the mother or father, friends, or even co-
workers are integrated in their own self (Markus and Kitayama,
1991). Consequently, concerning restrictions of freedom it should
be more important to individuals with a more interdependent self
that people who are integrated in their self (like siblings, mother,
farther, co-workers) are not restricted in their freedoms—this
is as if the person’s own freedom were restricted. For this
reason, we suggest that the more interdependent a person’s self-
construal, the stronger the experience of vicarious reactance
should be. Thus, they should show higher reactance when an in-
group member—e.g., a good friend—is restricted in his or her
freedom.However, people observing the restrictions of people not
belonging to their in-group—i.e., an out-group member—should
not show high reactance values. Moreover, with regard to self-
experienced reactance, we suggest that the more independent a
person’s self-construal the stronger should be the experience of
reactance compared to vicarious reactance.
The Present Research
Recent research showed that people can experience self- and
vicarious reactance (Sittenthaler and Jonas, 2012; Steindl and
Jonas, 2012; Sittenthaler et al., 2015, in preparation). Furthermore,
distinguishing between independent and interdependent self-
construal seems to be important for explaining people’s self-
reactance behavior as differences can be traced back to differences
in the self-construal of people (Jonas et al., 2009).
In the present article, we want to further explore cultural
background and self-construal differences in experiencing
(vicarious) reactance. As described above, people with a more
interdependent self-construal indeed have a greater focus
on other people. Self-construal differences cannot only be
observed between different cultures but also within one and the
same culture (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). In consequence,
we suggest that people with different self-construal differ in
experiencing (vicarious) restrictions. We furthermore suggest
that people differ in experiencing vicarious reactance for the in-
vs. the out-group. In a series of studies, Graupmann et al. (2012)
showed that collectivists experienced reactance in response to a
restriction of freedom only when it came from an out-group, but
conformity with the restriction when it came from an in-group.
These results suggest that it is crucial to specify the social
source of a threat to freedom when determining conditions for
psychological reactance. In the context of vicarious reactance
it might also be crucial to determine whether the observed
restricted person is a member of the in- or the out-group. In
our previous research we have not differentiated whether the
vicariously restricted person is an in- or out-groupmember of the
participant’s group. In the pilot study the vicariously-restricted
person was an in-group-member (e.g., a friend). We hypothesize
that for people with a more collectivistic cultural background
or a more interdependent self-construal, it should be much
more important that an in-group member (e.g., friend, sibling,
person of the same nationality, etc.) is not affected by restrictions
compared to an out-group member (e.g., person from another
nationality). We do not expect differences in experiencing
in- or out-group vicarious restrictions concerned to people with
an individualistic cultural background as well as people with a
more independent self-construal.
To test our hypothesis, we conducted two main studies to
investigate the phenomenon of vicarious as opposed to self-
experienced reactance in different cultural contexts (cultural
background and self-construal). Study 1 was conducted to show
that there are interesting differences in experiencing vicarious
reactance for the in-group or the out-group for the self-construal
focus. Moreover, in Study 2, we tried to replicate the results
of Study 1 focussing on cultural background differences and,
in addition, we assumed to find differences in participants’
behavioral intentions following self- and vicarious restrictions.
Moreover we hypothesize that our cultural diverse effects could
be explained through peoples’ individual level of self-construal3.
Study 1: Differences in Experiencing
Vicarious Reactance for the In- or
Out-group and the Role of Self-construal
We expected that people with a more interdependent self-
construal show more vicarious reactance for the in-group
compared to people with a more independent self-construal.
Furthermore, people with an independent self-construal should
show higher reactance in experiencing self-restrictions compared
to both forms of vicarious (in-group and out-group) restrictions.
More precisely, we expected a restriction  self-construal
interaction comparing the self-restricted and vicariously-in-
group restricted (but not for the vicariously-out-group) condition.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Design
Participants were volunteers (43 males, 115 females, 1 missing
value; N = 159) recruited at the University of Salzburg, Austria,
and in Munich. Participants had a mean age of 31.01 years
(SD = 12.74). The experiment was based on three experimental
conditions (restriction: self vs. vicarious in-group vs. vicarious
out-group). In addition we assessed one individual difference
variable (self-construal: independent vs. interdependent) as the
independent variable. The participants were randomly assigned
to the three restriction conditions.
Experimental Procedures
Participants were asked to participate in a 10-min paper-and-
pencil study and to complete all questions honestly and silently.
The questionnaire started with some general questions about sex,
age, and, field of study. After that, participants were asked to
reflect upon a “holiday-scenario,” in which their freedom was
restricted because they were held up by the police after an accident
while on vacation. In the self-restricted condition, they were asked
to imagine that they were held up by the police after an accident
without any good reasons. In the vicarious in-group condition,
3Both main studies as well as the pilot study were conducted before the ethical
board at the University of Salzburg was established in 2011. Nevertheless,
treatments of the participants in the studywere in accordancewithAPA ethical
standards.
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they had to imagine a person speaking the same language being
held up by the police whereas in the vicarious out-group condition
the participants had to imagine the same scenario for a person
speaking a foreign language. Consistent with the pilot study,
the internal consistency of the reactance scale “experience of
reactance” (a= 0.84, 7 items, e.g., “To what extent do you perceive
the reaction of the policeman as a restriction of freedom?” and
“How much pressure do you feel as a result of his reaction?”) was
acceptable, but not for our “behavioral intentions” scale (a= 0.58,
6 items, e.g., “Would you complain about the policeman’s behavior
at the police station?”). For this reasonwe did not further consider
this measure for our result section. Responses were made on a
scale from 1= strongly disagree to 10= strongly agree in this study.
Tomeasure independent and interdependent attitudes and values,
participants were then presented with the self-construal-short-
scale (Triandis andGelfand, 1998), which consists of 32 itemswith
a focus either on participant’s independent (8 items such as “My
personal identity, independent of others, is very important tome.,”
a = 0.78) or interdependent (8 items such as “I feel good when
I cooperate with others.,” a = 0.72) self-construal. All responses
were made on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree. At the end of the study, the volunteers were debriefed and
thanked for their participation.
Results
Experience of Reactance
For our measure of “Experience of Reactance,” we ran a univariate
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and found a significant main
effect of the restriction condition, F(2, 156) = 3.49, p = 0.033,
!2p = 0.04. Participants in the self-restricted condition (M = 6.31,
SD = 2.01) showed higher experience of reactance scores
compared to participants in the vicariously-in-group restricted
condition (M = 5.46, SD = 2.15) and the vicariously-out-
group condition (M = 5.31, SD = 2.20). Subsequent post
hoc analysis showed significant differences between both the
vicariously-out-group restricted (p = 0.016) and the vicariously-
in-group condition (p = 0.040) compared with the self-restricted
condition. In addition, there was no significant difference
between vicariously-out-group restricted and vicariously-in-
group restricted condition, p= 0.716.
Self-construal as Moderator
For further analyses concerning our assumption that people
with a more interdependent self-construal show more vicarious
reactance than people with a more independent self-construal
while people with a more independent self-construal show more
self-reactance than vicarious reactance, we followed previous
research and created a difference score between the scores on the
independent and interdependent sub-scales of the Triandis scale
(e.g., Holland et al., 2004; Pöhlmann et al., 2007; Jonas et al., 2009).
The correlation between the independent and the interdependent
measure was significant, i.e., dependent and not orthogonal
constructs [r(159)= 0.734, p< 0.001]. Consequently, a negative
value indicated relatively more interdependent self-construal
and a positive value indicated relatively more independent self-
construal.
FIGURE 1 | Study 1: Interactions Restriction  Self-Construal
experiencing reactance.
Furthermore, two dummy codes (Dummy1/Dummy2) were
created for the three restriction conditions (self-restricted
vs. vicariously-in-group restricted vs. vicariously-out-group-
restricted). In the following analyses, the self-restricted condition
is the reference group (Dummy 1 and Dummy 2 = 0). To test
our hypotheses, we conducted a regression analysis. Following
Aiken and West (1991) and Cohen et al. (2003), the interaction
terms were computed by a multiplication of the dummy variables
(self-restricted as reference group) with the z-standardized
difference score.
We found the assumed restriction  self-construal interaction
for vicariously-in-group restricted participants compared to the
self-restriction condition, b =  0.29, |t(157)| = 2.90, p = 0.004.
As expected, we did not find the restriction  self-construal
interaction comparing vicariously-out-group restricted condition
to the self-restricted condition, b =  0.08, |t(158)| = 0.75,
p = 0.453. The interactions are illustrated in Figure 1. According
to our hypothesis, we assumed that participants holding
a more interdependent self-construal should show more
experience of reactance when they are restricted vicariously
for the in-group, as opposed to participants holding a more
independent self-construal. The result pattern displayed in
Figure 1 seems to be consistent with this hypothesis. Simple
slope analyses were conducted to further analyze the interaction
between restriction (self vs. vicariously-in-group-restricted)
and self-construal (independent vs. interdependent; Aiken
and West, 1991). Simple slope analyses indicated that in the
vicariously-in-group-restricted condition, participants with a
more interdependent self-construal showed more reactance
compared to participants with a more independent self-construal,
b =  0.46, |t(106)| = 2.96, p = 0.004. There was a second
significant effect in the self-restriction condition: people with
an independent self-construal showed higher reactance scores
compared to people with a more interdependent self-construal,
b = 0.72, |t(106)| = 2.55 p = 0.012. Furthermore, participants
holding a more independent self-construal (+1 SD) showed
more reactance when they were self-restricted compared to
vicariously-in-group-restricted, b =  0.45, |t(106)| = 3.50,
p = 0.001, whereas participants holding a more interdependent
self-construal ( 1 SD) did not differ in their experience of
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reactance being self-restricted or vicariously-in-group-restricted,
b = 0.15, |t(106)| = 1.04, p= 0.300.
Comparing vicariously-in-group-restricted participants
and vicariously-out-group (vicariously-in-group-restricted
participants as reference group with two more dummies 3
and 4) a second significant interaction was found, b = 0.26,
|t(158)| = 2.17, p = 0.032. Simple slope analyses were conducted
to further analyze the interaction between restriction (vicariously-
in-group-restricted vs. vicariously-out-group-restricted) and
self-construal (independent vs. interdependent). Simple slope
analyses indicated that in the vicariously-in-group-restricted
condition participants with a more interdependent self-construal
showed more reactance compared to participants with a more
independent self-construal, b =  0.86, |t(103)| =  2.57,
p = 0.012. There was no significant effect in the vicarious-
out-group-restriction condition: people with an independent
self-construal showed nearly the same reactance scores compared
to people with a more interdependent self-construal, b =  0.00,
|t(103)| =  0.03, p = 0.974. Furthermore, participants holding
a more interdependent self-construal (  1 SD) showed more
reactance when they were vicariously-in-group-restricted
compared to vicariously-out-group-restricted, b =  0.32,
|t(103)| =  2.11, p = 0.037, whereas participants holding
a more independent self-construal (+1 SD) did not differ
in their experience of reactance being vicariously-out-group
or vicariously-in-group-restricted, b = 0.13, |t(103)| = 0.93,
p= 0.353.
Discussion
Study 1 could show that people holding a more interdependent
self-construal experienced more vicarious reactance with regard
to the in-group compared to people with a more independent
self-construal. This replicates our pilot study findings showing
that people with a more interdependent self-construal or a
collectivistic cultural background are much more concerned
by vicarious restrictions. In addition people with a more
interdependent self-construal showed more reactance when the
restriction originated in an in-group compared to an out-group
member. Furthermore, people with a more independent self-
construal showed more reactance experiencing self- restrictions
compared to vicarious restrictions. Moreover, people with a more
independent self-construal were much more affected by self-
restrictions compared to people with a more interdependent self-
construal.
Considering these results, it seems that people indeed
distinguish as to whether the other person who is vicariously
restricted is an in-group or an out-group member. Brewer and
Gardner (1996) found that people seek to maintain a positive
social identity by giving positive value to their own group
(in-group) and distinguishing their group from other groups
(out-groups). In a meta-analysis of conformity research across
cultures, Bond and Smith (1996) emphasized the influence of
group context on the collectivist’s tendency to conform with
group members. They pointed out that people with collectivistic
cultural background would thus be expected to conform more to
members of the in-group, and less to members of an out-group
than individualists. This is interesting considering our results that
people with a more interdependent self-construal showed higher
vicarious reactance values for a restricted in-group-member.
In the following Study 2, we wanted to replicate the pattern of
results from Study 1 when comparing people with a collectivistic
cultural background to people with an individualistic cultural
background. Furthermore, we looked at behavioral intentions in
addition to experience of reactance.
Study 2: Differences in Experiencing
Vicarious Reactance for the In- and
Out-group and the Role of Culture
In Study 2, we wanted to find out whether people with a
more collectivistic or individualistic cultural background also
differentiate between an in- vs. an out-group member when
experiencing vicarious reactance. Croatians and a few Bosnians
as well as Germans/Austrians were asked to imagine a holiday
situation being held up by the police after an accident. A cross-
cultural study by Tavakoli et al. (2003) showed that Croatian
people scored significantly higher in both Power Distance and
Uncertainty Avoidance while the United States scored higher in
both Individuality and Masculinity. The United States scored
extremely high on the Individuality dimension—in fact, they
got the highest score of those cultures studied by Hofstede
(1997)—while Croatia scored moderately on the individualism
dimension, being more of a collectivistic culture. Compared to
that, former research also showed that people of the United
States can be compared to West German people concerning
their individualism score (Suh et al., 1998; Schimmack et al.,
2002). Measuring the self-construal (Triandis and Gelfand, 1998)
in our study we could confirm those findings, our Croatian
participants (M =   0.69 SD = 0.80) were more collectivistic
compared to German/Austrian participants (M =   0.37
SD = 0.78), t(178) = 2.662, p = 0.008. As described in our pilot
study a negative value indicated relatively more interdependent
self-construal and a positive value indicated relatively more
independent self-construal.
For that reason, we assumed that people with a more
collectivistic cultural background experience more vicarious
reactance and show more behavioral intentions for the in-group
compared to people with a more individualistic background. We
also expect to find that the restriction  cultural background




Study 2 consisted of a 3 (restriction: self vs. vicarious in-group
vs. vicarious out-group)  2 (cultural background: collectivistic
vs. individualistic) factorial between subjects design. Participants
(N = 180) were randomly assigned to the experimental restriction
conditions. Austrian and German participants (n = 90) were
mainly recruited in Salzburg, Austria. Austrian and German
participants consisted of 54 male and 36 female with a mean age
of 35.39 (SD = 11.01). Croatian and a few Bosnian participants
(n = 90) were recruited via visiting people in different areas of
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Croatia and via the internet. Participants consisted of 46 male and
44 female with a mean age of 34.41 (SD = 11.55). Participants
recruited for this studywere employees (e.g., technicians, workers,
painters).
Experimental Procedures
Participants were invited to take part in a paper-and-pencil
questionnaire. First participants were asked to complete
demographic questions regarding their sex, age, and work.
After that, participants were asked to reflect upon the “holiday-
scenario,” restricting their freedom through being held up by the
police after an accident while on vacation in Spain, as already
described in Study 1. For the Croatian and Bosnian participants
the scenario and the whole questionnaire were translated and
also retranslated. Consistent with Study 1 and the pilot study,
the internal consistency of the “experience of reactance scale
was acceptable (a = 0.85, 7 items).” The internal consistency
of our additional measured “behavioral intentions” was also
acceptable, as we reformulated the items used in Study 1 as well as
generated “better” items for the specific used scenario (a = 0.83,
7 items, e.g., “To what extent would you describe this policeman
as incompetent to other people?” How strong is your wish to
complain about the policeman at the next police office? and
“Would you like to ruin this police’s reputation by publishing a
negative review on a respected newspaper?”). Answers were given
on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
Results
Experience of Reactance
Weran a 3 (restriction: self vs. vicarious in-group vs. vicarious out-
group) 2 (cultural background: collectivistic vs. individualistic)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the experience of reactance
measure and revealed a significant overall main-effect for
the cultural background, F(1, 174) = 15.64, p < 0.001,
!2p = 0.08, indicating that participants with a collectivistic cultural
background (M = 3.58, SD = 0.91) show higher experience
of reactance values than participants with an individualistic
cultural background (M = 3.03, SD = 0.99). We could also
find a significant main-effect for the restriction condition, F(2,
174) = 3.04, p = 0.050, !2p = 0.03, indicating that participants
in the self-restricted (M = 3.48, SD = 0.99) and the vicariously-
in-group-restricted conditions (M = 3.37, SD = 1.07) showed
higher experience of reactance scores than participants in the
vicariously-out-group-restricted condition (M= 3.07, SD= 0.86).
Subsequent post hoc analysis showed (marginal) significant
differences between both the self-restricted (p = 0.019) and the
vicariously-in-group-restricted condition (p = 0.080) compared
to the vicariously-out-group-restricted condition. In addition,
there was no significant difference between the self-restricted and
the vicariously-in-group-restricted condition, p= 0.539.
However, most importantly, we found the predicted cultural
background restriction interaction, F(2, 174)= 3.8 , p= 0.023,
!2p = 0.04. The follow-up simple effects analyses within
the vicariously-in-group-restricted condition supported our
hypothesis, that participants with a collectivistic cultural
background experience more vicarious reactance for their
TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations for experience of reactance.
“Individualistic cultural “Collectivistic cultural
background” a, b background” a, b
M SD M SD
Self-restricted 3.45 (n = 30) 0.93 3.50 (n = 30) 1.06
condition
Vicariously-in-group- 2.88 (n = 30) 1.03 3.86 (n = 30) 0.87
restricted Condition
Vicariously-out-group- 2.77 (n = 30) 0.90 3.38 (n = 30) 0.71
restricted condition
a Individualistic cultural background= Austrian/German participants; Collectivistic cultural
background= Croatian/Bosnian participants. bJudgments were made on a 5-point scale
with high values indicating high experience of reactance.
in-group compared to participants with an individualistic
cultural background, F(1, 174) = 16.88, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.09.
Moreover, within the vicariously-out-group-restricted condition
we revealed a significant effect, F(1, 174) = 6.40, p = 0.012,
!2p = 0.04, showing that people with a collectivistic cultural
background show more vicarious reactance for the out-group
compared to people with an individualistic cultural background.
In the self-restricted condition, the cultural background had
no effect on experience of reactance, F(1, 174) < 1, p = 0.832,
!2p < 0.01. Within the Collectivistic cultural background group,
participants in the vicariously-in-group-restricted condition
displayed higher reactance values compared with participants
in the vicariously-out-group-restricted condition, p = 0.043.
Participants being self-restricted experienced approximately
the same level of reactance compared to participants in the
vicariously-out-group-restricted condition, p = 0.602 and the
vicariously-in-group-restricted condition, p = 0.132. Following
the Individualistic cultural background group, participants in the
self-restricted condition showedmore reactance than participants
in the vicariously-in-group-restricted condition, p = 0.018 and
in the vicariously-out-group-restricted condition, p = 0.005.
Participants with an individualistic cultural background showed
the same level of reactance in the vicariously-in-group-restricted
condition and in the vicariously-out-group-restricted condition,
p= 0.649.Means and standard deviations are displayed inTable 2.
Behavioral Intentions
We ran a second 3 (restriction: self vs. vicarious in-group vs.
vicarious out-group)  2 (cultural background: collectivistic vs.
individualistic) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the behavioral
intentions measure and revealed a significant overall main-effect
for the cultural background, F(1, 174) = 17.53, p < 0.001,
!2p = 0.09, indicating that participants with a collectivistic cultural
background (M = 2.92, SD = 0.96) display higher values
concerning the behavioral intentions than participants with an
individualistic cultural background (M = 2.36, SD = 0.88). We
were not able to find a significant main-effect for the restriction
condition, F(2, 174) = 2.24, p= 0.109, !2p = 0.03.
However, most importantly, we found the predicted cultural
background restriction interaction, F(2, 174)= 3.87, p= 0.023,
!2p = 0.04. The follow-up simple effects analyses within
the vicariously-in-group-restricted condition supported our
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TABLE 3 | Means and standard deviations for behavioral intentions.
“Individualistic cultural “Collectivistic cultural
background” a, b background” a, b
M SD M SD
Self-restricted 2.68 (n = 30) 0.89 2.90 (n = 30) 1.09
condition
Vicariously-in-group- 2.15 (n = 30) 0.79 3.23 (n = 30) 0.96
restricted Condition
Vicariously-out-group- 2.25 (n = 30) 0.89 2.65 (n = 30) 0.74
restricted condition
a Individualistic cultural background= Austrian/German participants; Collectivistic cultural
background= Croatian/Bosnian participants. bJudgments were made on a 5-point scale
with high values indicating high behavioral intentions.
hypothesis, that participants with a collectivistic cultural
background showed more vicarious behavioral intentions for
their in-group compared to participants with an individualistic
cultural background, F(1, 174) = 21.57, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.11.
Within the vicariously-out-group-restricted condition we
revealed a marginal effect, F(1, 174)= 2.85, p= 0.093, !2p = 0.02,
showing that people with a collectivistic cultural background
tended to show more vicarious behavioral intentions for the
out-group compared to people with an individualistic cultural
background. In the self-restricted condition, the culture had
no effect on behavioral intentions, F(1, 174) < 1, p = 0.360,
!2p = 0.01. Within the Collectivistic cultural background group,
participants being self-restricted showed about the same level
of behavioral intentions compared with participants in the
vicariously-out-group-restricted condition, p = 0.284 and the
vicariously-in-group-restricted condition, p= 0.154. Participants
in the vicariously-in-group-restricted condition displayed higher
behavioral intentions values compared with participants in the
vicariously-out-group-restricted condition, p = 0.013. Following
the Individualistic cultural background group, participants
in the self-restricted condition showed more behavioral
intentions as participants in the vicariously-in-group-restricted
condition, p = 0.023 and in the vicariously-out-group-restricted
condition, p = 0.067. Participants with an individualistic
cultural background showed the same level of reactance in the
vicariously-in-group-restricted condition and vicariously-out-
group-restricted condition, p = 0.653. Means and standard
deviations are displayed in Table 3.
Mediation mechanisms
We tested whether the restriction  cultural background intera-
ction on reactance behavior was mediated by experience of
reactance. Thus an ANCOVA was performed with reactance
behavior as the dependent variable and experience of reactance
as the covariate. The interaction term (restriction x cultural
background) was reduced from F(2, 174) = 3.87, p = 0.023,
!2p = 0.04 without the mediator to F(2, 173) = 1.68, p = 0.189,
!2p = 0.02, where the mediator (experience of reactance)
was significant, F(1, 173) = 69.04, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.29.
Hence, these results support the assumption that experience
of reactance mediates the relationship between restriction and
cultural background on behavioral intentions with a substantial
reduction of the interaction effect size from 0.04 to 0.02
(approximately 50%).
Finally, we analyzed whether the effect observed for
participants from the two different cultural backgrounds
being self vs. vicariously-in-group restricted on behavioral
intentions could be explained through peoples’ individual
level of self-construal (mediator) using PROCESS (model
4, Hayes, 2013, p. 445). The analyses revealed a significant
influence of cultural background on behavioral intentions,
B = 0.75, SE = 0.18, t(110) = 4.20, p < 0.001, and the mediator
participants’ self-construal, B = -0.68, SE = 0.21, t(110) = -3.31,
p = 0.001. Subsequent analysis of the influence of the mediator
on behavioral intentions showed a significant regression weight,
B = 0.28, SE = 0.08, t(110) = 3.50, p < 0.001, indicating
considerable influence of mediator on behavioral intentions.
When finally examining the influence of the cultural background
and the mediator participants’ self-construal on behavioral
intentions concurrently, the effect of cultural background
still remained significant, B = 0.94, SE = 0.18, t(110) = 5.25,
p < 0.001. The indirect effect of the cultural background on
behavioral intentions through the mediator participants’ self-
construal was highly significant as indicated by the 95% CI
( 0.38, 0.07) using 5,000 bootstrap estimations.
Discussion
Study 2 showed that people with a collectivistic cultural
background (Croatian) experienced significantly more vicarious
reactance for the in-group compared to people with an
individualistic cultural background (Austrians/Germans).
We assumed that people with a collectivistic cultural background
being rather positively associated with the in-group (Triandis
et al., 1988) would react strongly when the in-group’s freedomwas
threatened and would therefore show more vicarious reactance
when an in-group member (as part of the group) was restricted
in his or her freedom. And indeed this was what our findings
confirmed. Furthermore, as stated by Triandis et al. (1988),
collectivists generally have higher levels of in-group commitment
than individualists. This finding is reflected in our results, our
Croatian participants seemed to be much more committed to
the person speaking their own language reading the holiday
scenario. Therefore they were also able to show more vicarious
reactance for this in-group person compared to an out-group
person speaking a foreign language.
In addition, participants with an individualistic cultural
background showed more self-experienced reactance compared
to vicarious reactance. People in individualistic cultures define
their self-construal more independently than interdependently
from others: the freedom to make one’s own choices and to
express one’s own desires and preferences are important (Triandis
et al., 1988; Hannover and Kühnen, 2002). As a consequence,
they feel significantlymore reactancewhen they are self-restricted.
People can also vary in the degree to which they identify
with their in-groups (Stangor and Thompson, 2002; Vignoles
and Moncaster, 2007). However, people with an individualistic
background seem to be less sensitive to vicarious restrictions of
an in-group-member. The same result pattern could be shown
for our second dependent variable “behavioral intentions.” People
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with a collectivistic cultural background showed more vicarious
behavioral intentions for the in-group compared to people with
an individualistic cultural background. An individualistic cultural
background also led to higher reactance in participants being
self-restricted compared to vicariously-restricted.
Furthermore, the mediation results showed that the behavioral
intentions differences which could be observed for the two
different cultural groups can be explained via self-construal
differences.
General Discussion
Discussion of the Results
In the current article, we were interested in investigating self-
experienced and vicariously-experienced reactance depending
on the cultural background of participants as well as differences
in self-construal. We sought to determine whether people with
a more interdependent self-construal or with a collectivistic
cultural background would show more vicarious reactance (for
the in-group) compared to people with a more independent
self-construal or an individualistic cultural background. In two
studies, we found consistent evidence for vicarious reactance
depending on participants’ culturally determined self-construal.
People with a more interdependent self-construal generally
reacted with more vicarious reactance and at the same time also
vicariously for the in-group compared to people with a more
independent self-construal (Study 1). The pilot study as well as
Study 2 could further demonstrate that people with a collectivistic
cultural background showed more vicarious reactance in
general as well as for the in-group compared to people with an
individualistic cultural background, which was in line with our
expectations. In contrast, participants with a more independent
self-construal or an individualistic cultural background
showed stronger reactance being self-restricted compared to
being vicariously-restricted. We were able to demonstrate the
differences in self-construal as a result of cultural background.
It seems that when observing other people’s restrictions
participants with a more interdependent self-construal or a
collectivistic cultural background are much better at feeling
with the restricted person and thus show higher vicarious
reactance values compared to people with a more independent
self-construal or an individualistic cultural background- and
perspective-taking seems to be crucial in understanding the
phenomenon of vicarious processes as Krach et al. (2011)
suggested, linking empathy to vicarious embarrassment in his
studies. Extending Miller’s (1987) work, he and his colleagues
postulate that it is an empathic process and, accordingly, the
capability to represent other people’s inner states that enables
observers to experience vicarious processes (i.e., vicarious
embarrassment). Previous research claimed that perspective
taking is valued more highly by persons with a collectivist
orientation compared to people with an individualistic
orientation (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Vorauer and Cameron,
2002). This is supported by a cross-cultural study showing that
cultural patterns of interdependence focus attention on the other,
causing Chinese to be better perspective takers than Americans
(Wu and Keysar, 2007).
Our vicarious reactance research might explain open questions
of averseness to foreigners (members of an out-group). As we
were able to show in our research, people are mainly affected
by restrictions concerning an in-group member. Thus, it is not
surprising that in daily life, people tend to help people of their own
nationality if they are in trouble (e.g., if they are being restricted)
rather than to help people of foreign nations. Furthermore
aggressions against out-groupmembers have often been observed
(e.g., Struch and Schwartz, 1989). In future research, it would be
interesting to develop a tool against xenophobic aggressions, e.g.,
an intervention, blocking people’s negative cogitation building
on our findings that vicarious reactance ought to be a cognitive
process (Sittenthaler et al., 2015, in preparation). A promising
approach is the idea that people should develop “cognitive
empathy,” described by Stephan and Finlay (1999): “Cognitive
empathy may reduce prejudice because it leads people to see that
they are less different from members of the other group than
they thought they were. [...] The feelings of threat engendered
by concerns over differences in values, beliefs, and norms,
misperceptions of realistic conflict, and anxiety over interacting
with members of the out-group may all be dissolved by learning
to view the world from the perspective of out-group members.
[...] Understanding the ways that others view the world has the
potential to make them seem less alien and frightening and thus
to break down the perceived barriers between the in-group and
the out-group” (p.735). As stated by Stephan and Finlay (1999),
an emotional affect such as empathy can easily be connected with
cognitive processes. In experiencing vicarious reactance people
also “feel” with the restricted person but also have to “think” about
the situation they observe. Future research should further address
our proposed combined dual-process and intertwined-process
model explaining vicarious reactance processes (Sittenthaler et al.,
2015, in preparation) to get the whole picture of the phenomenon
of vicarious reactance.
Limitations
Even though the present studies provide valuable new insights,
they also have important limitations.
One major concern is that we unfortunately did not have
equal alternatives in our reactance arousing scenarios. Thus
one could question whether reactance or another construct
as frustration is the main driving force in our studies. As
described in the Footnotes, we controlled for negative affect
(using the negative PANAS Scale). Although we found moderate
significant correlations with our reactance measures in Study
2 (indicating an overlap between both constructs) we only
found the specific culture  restriction interaction effect
on our reactance measure but not on the negative PANAS
measure (p = 0.495). Moreover, in a related study, in which
a choice option in the work context was eliminated (equal
office rooms) either for the participant herself/ himself or a
co-worker, we also found vicarious reactance effects for the
collectivistic subsample. In contrast to Western-Europeans East
Asians expressed heightened attractiveness for the option when
it had been excluded for their coworker (Graupmann and Jonas,
2015, in preparation). This conceptually replicates the findings of
the current studies and thus renders an alternative explanation via
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frustration unlikely. In addition, we also conceptually replicated
our results in a series of other studies we did with young children
(Austrian and Arabic cultural background) using different sweets
and little cuddly toys as alternatives and inwhichwe took away the
third ranked alternative. In these studies children indeed showed
attractiveness change for the third alternative as well as experience
of reactance on a child-modified experience of reactance scale
used in this paper. Moreover and most importantly children
showed much more vicarious reactance observing the restriction
of an in-group compared to an out-group member (Sittenthaler
and Jonas, 2015, in preparation). Taken together, these results
underline our assumption that reactance (and not frustration per
se) plays a crucial role in understanding culture dependent effects
on people’s responses to threats to their freedom.
Another limitation results from the fact that in our studies, we
only worked with participants with Arabic and Croatian as well
as German and Austrian background. However, these results add
to previous studies on vicarious reactance among people from
the Czech Republic, Romania, and the Philippines. But to have
a better understanding of cultural issues, research needs to cover
more geographically extended areas. The degree of experiencing
self- and vicarious reactance may vary from country to country
depending on the culture-specific self-construal. It should also be
noted that it would be interesting for future research to examine
more participants with a typical individualistic and collectivist
background (e.g., Japanese or American people) in order to
generalize the findings beyond the cases studied in our article
and to test whether this would result in even stronger differences.
Regarding cultural differences and self-construal differences,
Brewer and Chen (2007) suggested a theoretical framework and
conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism and
distinguished relational, collective, and individual selves drawing
on a conceptualization of Brewer and Gardner (1996). In order to
get a better understanding of cultural differences it is important
to get a clearer picture of the different determinants of people’s
self-construal. In future research work a main focus should be on
finding a better measure method to determine the self-construal
instead of using the Triandis self-construal scale. Moreover, one
should also be aware of cultural changes over time interpreting
culture-sensitive research results, as Podrug et al. (2014) recently
showed in a cross-cultural study that the most significant cultural
change is the shift toward individualism,mainly in Brazil, Croatia,
and Serbia.
We are also aware that we need to interpret our results with
caution, because all experiments were based on hypothetical
scenarios. However, with the results showing a consistent pattern
among different scenarios “job-scenario” and “holiday-scenario,”
we are confident that they could also be replicated with real
behavior in future research.
Conclusion
In sum, our research shows that people with individualistic
compared to collectivistic cultural backgrounds indeed
experience self-restrictions and vicarious restrictions differently.
People with a collectivistic cultural background or a more
interdependent self-focus are more affected when experiencing
vicarious restrictions of other persons, especially in-group
members. In contrast, people with an individualistic cultural
background or a more independent self-construal are much
more affected by self-restrictions and show high experience of
reactance as well as behavioral intentions scores compared to
vicarious restrictions. An important follow-up question would be
which furthermediators could explain the occurrence of vicarious
reactance depending on different self-construal and culture focus.
The investigation of this and other questions will be the subject of
further research.
Acknowledgments
Weare grateful toHaliemahMocevic, Ljiljana Zubonja and several
psychology students for their help in the data collection. We
would like to thank Eva-Maria Kubin for her helpful comments
on an earlier version of this manuscript. The authors would also
like to thank several anonymous reviewers for their helpful and
constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.
References
Aiken, L. S., and West, S. G. (1991). Multiple Regression: Testing and Interpreting
Interactions. New York, NY: Russell Sage.
Andreoli, V. A., Worchel, S., and Folger, R. (1974). Implied threat to behavioral
freedom. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 30, 765–771. doi: 10.1037/h0037529
Barry, D. (2005). Measuring acculturation among male Arab immigrants in
the United States: an exploratory study. J. Immigr. Health 7, 179–184. doi:
10.1007/s10903-005-3674-9
Barry, D., Elliott, R., and Evans, E. M. (2000). Foreigners in a strange land: self-
construal and ethnic identity in male Arabic immigrants. J. Immigr. Health 2,
133–144. doi: 10.1023/A:1009508919598
Batson, C. D., Fultz, J., and Schoenrade, P. A. (1987). Distress and empathy:
two qualitatively distinct vicarious emotions with different motivational
consequences. J. Pers. 55, 19–39. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1987.tb00426.x
Batson, C. D., Kennedy, C. L., Nord, L. A., Stocks, E. L., Fleming, D. A., Marzette,
C. M., et al. (2007). Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage? Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.
37, 1272–1285. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.434
Bond, R., and Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and conformity: ameta-analysis of studies
using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychol. Bull. 119, 113–137. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.111
Brehm, J. W. (1966). A Theory of Psychological Reactance. New York, NY: Academic
Press.
Brehm, J. W. (1972). Responses to Loss of Freedom: A Theory of Psychological
Reactance. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
Brehm, S. S., and Brehm, J. W. (1981). Psychological Reactance. A Theory of Freedom
and Control. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Brewer, M. B., and Chen, Y. (2007). Where (who) are collectives in
collectivism? Toward a conceptual clarification of individualism and
collectivism. Psychol. Rev. 114, 133–151. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.114.
1.133
Brewer, M. B., and Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this “we”? Levels of collective
identity and self representation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 71, 83–93. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.71.1.83
Bushman, B. J., and Stack, A. D. (1996). Forbidden fruit versus tainted fruit: effects
of warning labels on attraction to television violence. J. Exp. Psychol. Appl. 2,
207–226. doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.2.3.207
Clee, M. A., and Wicklund, R. A. (1980). Consumer behavior and psychological
reactance. J. Consum. Res. 6, 389–405. doi: 10.1086/208782
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., and Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied Multiple
Regression/ Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 3rd Edn. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 105211
Sittenthaler et al. Vicarious reactance and the role of self-construal and culture
Cross, S. E., Hardin, E. E., and Gercek-Swing, B. (2011). The What, How,
Why, and Where of self-construal. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 15, 142–179. doi:
10.1177/1088868310373752
Croucher, S. M., Borton, I. M., Oommen, D., Turner, J. S., and Anarbaeva, S. (2008).
A comparative analysis between Muslim and Non-Muslim self-construals and
conflict styles in France and Britain. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the International Communication Association, TBA, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Available at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p231519_index.html [accessed
November 12, 2010].
Donnell, A. J., Thomas, A., and Buboltz, W. C. Jr. (2001). Psychological
reactance: factor structure and internal consistency of the questionnaire for
the measurement of psychological reactance. J. Soc. Psychol. 141, 679–687. doi:
10.1080/00224540109600581
Dowd, E. T., Milne, C. R., and Wise, S. L. (1991). The therapeutic reactance
scale: a measure of psychological reactance. J. Couns. Devel. 69, 541–545. doi:
10.1002/j.1556-6676.1991.tb02638.x
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Schaller, M., Miller, P., Carlo, G., Poulin, R., et al. (1991).
Personality and socialization correlates vicarious emotional responding. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 61, 59–470. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.61.3.459
Fitzsimons, G. J., and Lehmann, D. R. (2004). Reactance to recommendations:
when unsolicited advice yields contrary responses. Mark. Sci. 23, 82–94. doi:
10.1287/mksc.1030.0033
Graupmann, V., Jonas, E., Meier, E., Hawelka, S., and Aichhorn, M. (2012).
Reactance, the self, and its group: when threats to freedom come from
the ingroup versus the outgroup. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 42, 164–173. doi:
10.1002/ejsp.857
Hannover, B., and Kühnen, U. (2002). Der Einfluss independenter und
interdependenter Selbstkonstruktion auf die Informationsverarbeitung im
sozialen Kontext. Psychol. Rundsch. 53, 61–76. doi: 10.1026//0033-3042.53.2.61
Hasan, A. G. (2001). American Muslims the New Generation. New York, NY:
Continuum International Publishing Group Inc.
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process
Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. New York, NY: Guilford.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s Consequences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (1997). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. London:
McGraw-Hill.
Holland, R. W., Roeder, U. R., Van Barren, R. B., Brandt, A. C., and Hannover, B.
(2004). Don’t stand so close to me: the effects of self construal on interpersonal
closeness. Psychol. Sci. 15, 237–242. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00658.x
Hong, Y.-Y., and Chiu, C.-Y. (2001). Toward a paradigm shift: from cross-
cultural differences in social cognition to social-cognitive mediation of cultural
differences. Soc. Cogn. 19, 181–196. doi: 10.1521/soco.19.3.181.21471
Jameela, M. (1967). Islam in Theory and Practice. Mohammad Yusuf Khan, Lahore
Pakistan: Sant Nagar.
Jonas, E., Graupmann, V., Niesta Kayser, D., Zanna, M., Traut-Mattausch,
E., and Frey, D. (2009). Culture, self, and the emergence of reactance:
is there a “universal” freedom? J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 45, 1068–1080. doi:
10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.005
Kanagawa, C., Cross, S. E., and Markus, H. R. (2001). Who am I? The cultural
psychology of the conceptual self. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 27, 90–103. doi:
10.1177/0146167201271008
Kolstad, A., and Horpestad, S. (2009). Self-construal in chile and norway:
implications for cultural differences in individualism and collectivism. J. Cross
Cult. Psychol. 40, 275–281. doi: 10.1177/0022022108328917
Krach, S., Cohrs, J. C., de Echeverría Loebell, N. C., Kircher, T., Sommer, J.,
Jansen, A., et al. (2011). Your flaws are my pain: linking empathy to vicarious
embarrassment. PLoS ONE 6:e18675. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0018675
Lickel, B., Miller, N., Stenstrom, D. M., Denson, T. F., and Schmader, T. (2006).
Vicarious retribution: the role of collective blame in intergroup aggression. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Rev. 10, 372–390. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_6
Lickel, B., Schmader, T., Curtis, M., Scarnier, M., and Ames, D. R. (2005).
Vicarious shame and guilt. Group Process. Intergroup Relat. 8, 145–157. doi:
10.1177/1368430205051064
Markus, H. R., and Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: implications
for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychol. Rev. 98, 224–253. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224
Menon, T., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C., and Hong, Y. (1999). Culture and the construal
of agency: attribution to individual versus group dispositions. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 76, 701–717. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.76.5.701
Miller, R. S. (1987). Empathic embarrassment: situational and personal
determinants of reactions to the embarrassment of another. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 53, 1061–1069. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.53.6.1061
Miron, A. M., and Brehm, J. W. (2006). Reactance theory-40 years later. Z.
Sozialpsychol. 37, 9–18. doi: 10.1024/0044-3514.37.1.9
Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., and Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems
of thought: holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychol. Rev. 108, 291–310. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.108.2.291
Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., and Collins, A. (1988). The Cognitive Structure of Emotions.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511571299
Podrug, N., Filipović, D., and Stančić, I. (2014). Analysis of cultural differences
between Croatia, Brazil, Germany, and Serbia. Econ. Res.-Ekon. Istraživanja 27,
818–829. doi: 10.1080/1331677X.2014.974915
Pöhlmann, C., Carranza, E., Hannover, B., and Iyengar, S. S. (2007). Repercussions
of self-construal for self-relevant and other-relevant choice. Soc. Cogn. 25,
284–305. doi: 10.1521/soco.2007.25.2.284
Roseman, I. (2009). “Motivations and emotivations: approach, avoidance and other
tendencies in motivated and emotional behavior,” in Handbook of Approach
and Avoidance Motivation, ed. A. J. Elliot (New York, NY: Psychology Press),
343–366.
Savani, K., Markus, H. R., and Conner, A. L. (2008). Let your preference be
your guide? Preferences and choices are more tightly linked for Americans
than for North Indians. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 95, 861–876. doi: 10.1037/
a0011618
Scherer, K. R. (1998). Emotion processes in media context: research illustrations
and perspectives for the future.Medienpsychologie 10, 276–293.
Schimmack, U., Radhakrishnan, P., Oishi, S., Dzokoto, V., and Ahadi, S. (2002).
Culture, personality, and subjective well-being: integrating process models of
life satisfaction. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 82, 582–593. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.82.
4.582
Schmitt, M., Gollwitzer, M., Maes, J., and Arbach, D. (2005). Justice sensitivity:
assessment and location in the personality space. Eur. J. Psychol. Assess. 21,
202–211. doi: 10.1027/1015-5759.21.3.202
Schubert, T. W., and Otten, S. (2002). Overlap of self, ingroup, and outgroup:
pictorial measures of self-categorization. Self Identity 1, 353–376. doi:
10.1080/152988602760328012
Schwarzer, R., and Jerusalem, M. (1995). “Generalized self-efficacy scale,” in
Measures in Health Psychology: A User’s Portfolio. Causal and Control Beliefs, eds
J. Weinman, S. Wright, and M. Johnston (Windsor: NFER-NELSON), 35–37.
Silvia, P. J. (2005). Deflecting Reactance: the role of similarity in increasing
compliance and reducing resistance. Basic. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 27, 277–284. doi:
10.1207/s15324834basp2703_9
Silvia, P. J. (2006). Reactance and the dynamics of disagreement: multiple paths
from threatened freedom to resistance to persuasion. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 36,
673–685. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.309
Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self
construals. Per. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 20, 580–591. doi: 10.1177/0146167294205014
Sittenthaler, S., and Jonas, E. (2012). “Nein Ivan, du bist nicht an der Reihe!”
Kulturelle Unterschiede im Erleben von (stellvertretender) Reaktanz. [“No Ivan,
it is not your turn”! Cultural differences in experiencing (vicarious) reactance].
Psychol. Österr. 32, 64–72.
Stangor, C., and Thompson, E. (2002). Individual functions of prejudice: group
differentiation and self-enhancement. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 32, 563–575.
Steindl, C., and Jonas, E. (2012). What reasons might the other one
have?—Perspective taking to reduce psychological reactance in individualists
and collectivists. Psychology 3, 1153–1160. doi: 10.4236/psych.2012.
312A170
Stephan, W. G., and Finlay, K. (1999). The role of empathy in improving intergroup
relations. J. Soc. Issues 4, 729–743. doi: 10.1111/0022-4537.00144
Struch, N., and Schwartz, S. H. (1989). Intergroup aggression: its predictors
and distinctness from in-group bias. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 56, 364–373. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.56.3.364
Suh, M., Diener, E., Oishi, S., and Triandis, H. C. (1998). The shifting basis of
life satisfaction judgments across cultures: emotions versus norms. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 74, 482–493. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.2.482
Tavakoli, A. A., Keenan, J. P., and Crnjak-Karanovic, B. (2003). Culture
and whistleblowing an empirical study of Croatian and United States
managers utilizing Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. J. Bus. Ethics 4, 49–64. doi:
10.1023/A:1022959131133
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 105212
Sittenthaler et al. Vicarious reactance and the role of self-construal and culture
Triandis, H., Bontempo, R., Villareal, M., Asai, M., and Luca, N. (1988).
Individualism and collectivism: cross-cultural perspectives on self in group
relationships. J. Res. Pers. 19, 395–415.
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Triandis, H. C. (1996). The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. Am.
Psychol. 51, 407–415. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.51.4.407
Triandis, H. C., and Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal
and vertical individualism and collectivism. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 74, 118–128.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.1.118
Varnum, M. E., Grossmann, I., Kitayama, S., and Nisbett, R. E. (2010). The origin
of cultural differences in cognition the social orientation hypothesis. Curr. Dir.
Psychol. Sci. 19, 9–13. doi: 10.1177/0963721409359301
Varnum, M. E., Grossmann, I., Nisbett, R. E., and Kitayama, S. (2008). Holism
in a European cultural context: differences in cognitive style between
Central and East Europeans and Westerners. J. Cogn. Cult. 8, 321–333. doi:
10.1163/156853708X358209
Vignoles, V. L., andMoncaster, N. (2007). Identity motives and ingroup favouritism:
a new approach to individual differences in intergroup discrimination. Br. J. Soc.
Psychol. 46, 91–113. doi: 10.1348/014466605X85951
Vorauer, J. D., and Cameron, J. J. (2002). So close, and yet so far: does collectivism
foster transparency overestimation? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 83, 1344–1352. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1344
Wang, Q. (2001). Culture effects on adults’ earliest childhood recollection and self-
description: implications for the relation between memory and the self. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 81, 220–233. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.2.220
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., and Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and
validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS
scales. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 54, 1063–1070. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.
1063
Wicklund, R. A. (1974). Freedom and Reactance. New York, NY: Wiley.
Worchel, S., and Brehm, J. W. (1971). Direct and implied social restoration of
freedom. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 18, 294–304. doi: 10.1037/h0031000
Worchel, S., Insko, C. A., Andreoli, V. A., and Drachman, D. (1974). Attribution
of attitude as a function of behavioral direction and freedom: reactance in
the eye of the observer. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 10, 399–414. doi: 10.1016/0022-
1031(74)90009-2
Wu, S., and Keysar, B. (2007). The effect of culture on perspective taking. Psychol.
Sci. 18, 600–606. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01946.x
Zwingmann, C., Hellmeister, G., and Ochsmann, R. (1994). Intrinsische und
extrinsische Orientierung: fragebogenskalen zum Einsatz in der empirisch-
religionspsychologischen Forschung [Intrinsic and extrinsic religious
orientation: questionnaire scales in use for psychological studies of religion]. Z
Differentielle Diagnostische Psychol. 15, 131–139.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Sittenthaler, Traut-Mattausch and Jonas. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 105213
